Duqm and the Gulf’s Logistics Corridors

1. A multimodal hub under construction

The Special Economic Zone at Duqm (SEZAD), in the Al Wusta Governorate, covers roughly 2,000 km² some 550 km from Muscat — the largest special economic zone in the MENA region. The multipurpose port, operational since 2012 and developed as a joint venture between ASYAD and a consortium led by the Port of Antwerp, has 2,200 metres of commercial quay with an 18-metre draft, able to accommodate virtually any vessel type. Around the port, a dry dock for ship repair, a fishing port, an operational regional airport and a road network built with a stated investment of roughly USD 8 billion have developed.

The piece still under construction is rail. The Fahud–Haima–Duqm segment, roughly 350 km of non-electrified double track for mixed freight/passenger traffic, is considered a priority link connecting the port to the GCC rail network and forms part of Oman’s wider national railway project, some 2,135 km in total. At the time of writing this segment is at the design/engineering stage — an important point to monitor, since it is the rail connection, more than the already-operational port, that will determine Duqm’s real step-change as a multimodal hub.

2. The growing relevance of the INSTC corridor

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a roughly 7,200 km multimodal network launched in 2000 by Russia, Iran and India and progressively expanded to Azerbaijan, Belarus and several Central Asian countries, running along three main branches (a western route via Azerbaijan and the Caspian, a central route between St Petersburg and Iranian ports, and an eastern route towards Central Asia). Industry analysis puts the infrastructure at roughly 75% complete; in 2024 the corridor moved approximately 26.9 million tonnes of cargo, up 19% year-on-year, with transit times roughly half those of the Suez Canal route.

Several Gulf states, including Oman, have publicly expressed interest in integrating into this connectivity network: according to the Gulf Research Center, Oman signed a memorandum to this effect in 2024. For a gateway such as Duqm — already oriented towards Asian markets and equipped with its own port infrastructure — even partial connection to INSTC-related flows would represent an expansion of its potential traffic base, complementary to traditional routes.

3. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis and the resilience question

Between February and August 2026, the conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel had a direct and severe impact on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz: news sources report traffic reductions of 70–90%, with peaks of up to 95% at the height of the crisis, hundreds of vessels and thousands of mariners stranded in the Persian Gulf, and Brent crude peaking above USD 126 a barrel in March. A memorandum signed on 17 June 2026 supported a partial normalisation of maritime traffic, with some major carriers returning to established routes; however, several sources point to renewed tension in the following weeks, and the situation had not fully stabilised at the time of writing (early September 2026) — a point that warrants ongoing tracking rather than being treated as settled.

During the acute phase of the crisis, volumes shifted towards smaller Gulf ports (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Port Sultan Qaboos), while some sources report that Omani ports on the Arabian Sea coast — including the Duqm area — were not entirely untouched by conflict-related episodes, with coastal waters temporarily placed in higher marine-insurance risk bands. The correct reading of these events, from the standpoint of anyone assessing investment in the region, is not that Duqm is by definition a “safe” alternative port — no Gulf node proved fully immune to the crisis — but that the resilience of the regional supply chain will increasingly depend on diversifying routes, ports and land corridors, rather than on relying on a single maritime chokepoint.

4. Operational implications for operators and investors

For anyone assessing entry into this landscape, several elements remain central to due diligence: verify the actual state of infrastructure completion (the rail component is not yet operational) before assuming immediate multimodal connectivity; favour direct institutional engagement with SEZAD and ASYAD over reliance on unverifiable intermediaries; strengthen counterparty due diligence whenever flows touch — even indirectly — jurisdictions subject to international sanctions regimes, regardless of Oman’s own specific stance on those regimes; treat the evolving regional security environment as a structural variable in risk assessment, not a contingent factor expected to resolve quickly.

Points to watch in the coming months

• Progress on the Fahud–Haima–Duqm rail segment
• Any new formal agreements between Oman and INSTC promoters
• Developments in the Strait of Hormuz situation and their impact on marine insurance premiums in the area
• Any new sanctions packages affecting the regional logistics chain

MOOVE.IT tracks infrastructure and regulatory developments in the Duqm area and, more broadly, across the Gulf’s logistics corridors, supporting international operators through scouting, due diligence and local partnership structuring.

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